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THE URBAN NEXUS: OPEN SPACE, BROWNFIELDS, 
AND JUSTICE 
Paul Stanton Kibel* 
The belief among suburbanites that they are independent of central 
cities is a delusion. 1 
INTRODUCTION: RECLAIMING THE CITY 
It is a common instinct to adopt simple explanations for complex 
problems. To make sense of the crises that confront us, we seek to 
isolate the trigger, the underlying force behind all that is not right. 
The declining state of America's urban centers provides a prime ex-
ample of our drive to pinpoint the cause, to name and reveal the 
particular policy, institution, or group of persons that is the true 
culprit. 
The reality of urban decline in America, particularly in our older 
cities, is one of the only points not in dispute.2 The statistics provide 
clear evidence of the situation and of the general trends that are at 
work. For several decades the U.S. population has been moving from 
urban centers to suburban locations, and the number of citizens living 
in the suburbs now exceeds the number of citizens living in the cities.3 
Open space surrounding urban centers is rapidly being converted to 
residential and commercial use, while large tracts of urban housing 
* Adjunct Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law (San Francisco); Faculty Editor 
for special edition of GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. on The City and the Environment; LL.M. 
Candidate, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Willamette Uni-
versity; B.A., Colgate College. The author thanks the members of the San Francisco 
Brownfields Working Group for their help with this Essay. 
I ANTHONY DOWNS, BROOKINGS INST. AND LINCOLN INST., NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLI-
TAN AMERICA 52 (1994). 
2 See generally id. 
31d. at 57. 
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and commercial property are now vacant, polluted, or both.4 The gap 
in per capita income between urban residents and suburban residents 
is growing ever wider, and the crime and unemployment rates in 
urban areas are growing higher.5 Minority populations in declining 
urban cores have become more geographically isolated, creating a 
situation of de facto segregation.6 As the city tax base declines, mu-
nicipal governments have less resources to support education, police, 
and other essential services, thereby furthering urban decline and the 
exodus to the suburbs.7 
These statistics and observations are not offered in support of any 
argument. They are simply a summary of a broad economic, environ-
mental, and racial phenomenon that most of us have observed with 
our own eyes and experienced in our own lives. In its most condensed 
form, this phenomenon is as follows: Jobs and people are moving out 
of urban centers into formerly pristine surrounding areas leaving 
behind polluted vacant lots and unemployed minority populations.8 
4 See Steven F. Fairlie, The New Greenfields Legislation: A Practitioner's Guide to Recycling 
Old Industrial Sites, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 77, 78 (1996). 
5 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 47. 
Id. 
Another force weakening ties between central cities and suburbs is an increasingly 
geographic separation of socioeconomic groups. In 1990, median household income was 
38 percent higher in the suburbs than in the central cities. In metropolitan areas of 1 
million or more residents, household income was 45 percent higher in suburbs; in 
smaller metropolitan areas the difference was 26 percent. Low-income people are 
becoming more and more concentrated in central cities .... 
6 See PENNSYLVANIA HORTICULTURAL SOC'y, URBAN VACANT LAND: ISSUES AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 17 (1995) [hereinafter URBAN VACANT LANDJ. 
Id. 
In the years after World War II people-primarily Whites-lured by the dream of 
single family houses with yards and the availability of cheap mortgage financing, and 
driven by racial fears, began moving to suburban communities .... This pattern has 
... also contributed to center city abandonment and the isolation of disadvantaged 
urban communities that are increasingly segregated by both race and class. 
7 See Steven K. Koyasako, Brownfields-California EPA's Policy and Legal Response, 4 
LAND USE & ENV'T F. 155,155 (1995). "Vacant brownfields sites are not only a wasted resource; 
they also significantly erode the tax base and contribute to urban blight and economic decline 
in historically industrial urban centers." Id.; see also William B. Shore, Recentralization: The 
Single Answer to More Than a Dozen United States Problems and a Major Answer to Poverty, 
J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N, at 500 (Fall 1995). "As more well-to-do households and major non-resi-
dential taxpayers moved out of the cities and the burdens of poverty become more concentrated 
in cities, taxes went up and services declined for those who remained." Id. (emphasis in original); 
see also URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, THE BROWNFIELDS LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND 
COMMUNITY REVITALIZATION PROJECT 1 (1995) ("Urban communities of color bear the brunt, 
battered by unemployment, deepening environmental inequities and cutbacks in social services, 
health care and education.") 
8 See PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS: ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND 
THE AMERICAN DREAM 9 (1993). "The result of this era is that both the city and the suburb are 
1998] ESSAY 591 
Although it is not too difficult a task to describe the reality of urban 
decline, it is another task altogether to identify and isolate the under-
lying trigger of this decline. Many different culprits have been pro-
posed, including racism, capitalism, environmental extremism, post-
industrialism, technology, drugs, the media, the automobile, the 
police, the public school system, too much government regulation, and 
too little government regulation. Is one of the these issues or entities 
the true cause? Is there a precise cause and effect explanation for why 
our cities are now subject to such powerful and destructive economic, 
environmental, and racial pressures? 
These are important questions, but questions that I will not try to 
answer in this Essay. Regardless of whether there initially was an 
underlying trigger, we have reached a point where the various com-
ponents of urban decline are now feeding on and reinforcing each 
other.9 They are all interconnected contributors to the downward 
spiral that has left our urban cores in their current condition.10 There-
fore, instead of arguing for or against a particular underlying cause, 
this Essay will focus on the relation among certain critical components 
of the urban decline cycle. More specifically, I will assess three par-
ticular components: (1) the impact of suburban sprawl and open space 
conversion on the urban economy and the environment; (2) the impact 
of environmental hazardous waste liability on the development of 
urban neighborhoods and the urban economy; and (3) the impact of 
suburban sprawl and environmental hazardous waste liability on the 
health conditions and economic welfare of poor, primarily minority, 
communities living in the urban core. Although my analysis will draw 
extensively on the experience in the San Francisco Bay Area, this 
Essay is not city-specific. The Essay addresses issues that are affect-
ing virtually every major U.S. metropolitan area. 
To be certain, open space loss, abandoned brownfields, and eco-
nomic inequity are not the only components of the urban decline cycle. 
However, they are three areas in which existing law, especially in 
terms of land-use zoning and environmental liability, has played a 
crucial role. They therefore are also areas where legal reform poten-
now locked in a mutually negating evolution toward loss of community. In practical terms, these 
patterns of growth have created on one side congestion, pollution and isolation, and on the other 
urban disinvestment and economic hardship." [d. 
9 See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 18; see generally JAMES BOYD ET AL., RE-
SOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE IMPACTS OF UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ON 
INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
(1994). 
10 See Carl Anthony, Making Brownfields Bloom, LAND AND PEOPLE, Fall 1996, at 25. 
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tially can playa crucial role in reversing the pattern of urban decline. 
By providing a useful framework in which to evaluate such reform, 
this Essay should assist lawyers and other citizens who are working 
to reclaim our cities as beautiful, vibrant, and just communities. 
Section I discusses the origins and impacts of, and responses to, 
open space conversion. Section II addresses the impact of hazardous 
waste liability laws on the abandonment of urban properties, and how 
new federal and state reforms might enable reclamation of these 
so-called "brownfields." Section III explains how zoning, environ-
mental liability, and brownfields reclamation have impacted the eco-
nomic and health conditions of poor communities living in the urban 
core. Section IV discusses strategies to reconcile the goals of open 
space preservation, hazardous waste remediation, and justice. 
1. OPEN SPACE AND THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 
For the past half century, there has been one dominant paradigm 
for metropolitan growth in the United States. That paradigm has 
been described as unlimited suburban sprawl l1 or "low density discon-
tinuous development."12 The basic component of this metropolitan 
paradigm has been the conversion of wilderness and farmland, com-
monly called open space, to commercial and residential use.13 In this 
conversion scenario, the emphasis has been on the development of 
shopping centers and business/industrial parks (for commercial use), 
and planned communities with detached, single family homes with 
yards (for residential use).14 
Before turning to the present day economic and environmental 
consequences of this development pattern, I will first revisit its ori-
gins. In the modern context, the terms "city" and "suburb" have taken 
on very strong political and cultural meanings. As Zignew Rybczyn-
ski, an urban historian at the University of Pennsylvania, explained 
in his 1995 book, City Life, the two terms "are often only polemical 
categories: depending on your point of view, either bad (dangerous, 
11 See BANK OF AMERICA, THE CALIFORNIA RESOURCES AGENCY, GREENBELT ALLIANCE 
AND THE Low INCOME HOUSING FUND, BEYOND SPRAWL: NEW PATTERNS OF GROWTH TO FIT 
THE NEW CALIFORNIA 1-5 (1995) [hereinafter BEYOND SPRAWL]. 
12 See STEVEN HAYWARD, CALIFORNIA BLDG. INDUS. ASS'N, PRESERVING THE AMERICAN 
DREAM: THE FACTS ABOUT SUBURBAN COMMUNITIES AND HOUSING CHOICE 1 (1996). 
13 See Jim Sayer, Green Edges for Healthy Cities, THE URBAN ECOLOGIST, Spring 1994, at 1; 
see also ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS; THE RISE AND FALL OF SUBURBIA 157 
(1987). 
14 See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 14-15. 
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polluted, concrete) cities and good (safe, healthy, green) suburbs, or 
good (diverse, dense, stimulating) cities and bad (homogeneous, 
sprawling, dull) suburbs."15 Beneath these polarized meanings, how-
ever, there is a great deal of historical and ideological undergrowth. 
We must examine this undergrowth to make sense of where we are 
today, to place the debate over open space conversion and the explod-
ing metropolis in a broader context. 
Although the conversion of open space to commercial and residen-
tial use is often thought of as a recent trend, in many ways it is a 
continuation of a deeply ingrained American tradition.16 This tradition 
is based on the frontier. For hundreds of years, the American experi-
ence involved the push westward across the continent, clearing wil-
derness and breaking the land.17 The American frontier provided an 
outlet for those who were dissatisfied with their economic or social 
prospects in a given location; they could vote with their feet, by 
moving west to a less congested, less socially stratified, or less expen-
sive region of the country.18 
The outlet of the frontier played a critical role in shaping the u.S. 
economy and American society. It meant that the upward mobility of 
the lower and middle classes need not come at the direct expense of 
the more established upper class; that issues of economic equity and 
justice could be put off indefinitely. It meant that Americans were less 
tied to geographic place, and therefore when confronted with regional 
problems, were more likely to move than to seek place-specific solu-
tions.19 The national experience with the western frontier helped es-
tablish the values and patterns that would later lead to suburban 
sprawl and urban decay. 
The forces that would contribute to the geographic decentralization 
of urban areas were identified early on. In 1900, H.G. Wells published 
15 ZIGNEW RYBCZYNSKI, CITY LIFE 176 (1995). 
16 See Dan Tarlock, City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity in Context, 21 FORDHAM 
URB. L.I. 461, 482--83 (1994). 
17 See BROOKINGS INST. AND THE LINCOLN INST. FOR LAND POL'y, ALTERNATIVES TO 
SPRAWL 4 (1995). "Many observers see sprawl as the natural product of an inherit trait in the 
American character. Peter Linneman, for instance, advances the notion that modern-day sprawl 
can be traced to the historic American drive to push back the frontier and settle a vast 
continent." ld. 
18 See generally KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1985). 
19 See generally JAMES KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE 
OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE (1993). 
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a prophetic essay entitled The Probable Diffusion of Great Cities.20 
In this essay, Wells forecast that urban regions would become so vast 
that the very concept of the city would become "as obsolete as the 
mailcoach."21 From Wells' perspective, this diffusion was not alto-
gether negative. It offered people the possibility of a healthier and 
less congested life, of an alternative to the disease and filth that often 
characterized turn of the century industrial cities.22 
As Wells' 1900 essay suggests, initially the concept of suburbs and 
suburbanization did not carry with it the cultural and environmental 
stigma that it carries today. The first generation of suburbs in the 
U.S., such as Philadelphia's Chestnut Hill, Chicago's Lake Forest, and 
Cleveland's Shaker Heights, bore little resemblance to the suburbs of 
today.23 Unlike contemporary sprawl, the first generation of suburbs 
in America were equated with innovative land-use planning, high-
quality architecture, pedestrian access, and good suburban-urban 
public transportation (usually by train).24 In fact, it was the success of 
these early "garden suburbs" that created the market for, and the 
allure of, suburbanization. Prior to Chestnut Hill, Lake Forest, and 
Shaker Heights, the American dream, at least residentially speaking, 
focused mostly on the city, the farm or, perhaps if you were rich 
enough, the country estate. The garden suburbs of the early twenti-
eth century moved the suburban ideal towards the center of the 
American identity. 
The tragedy is that the very characteristics that drew people to the 
first generation of suburbs began to disappear as more and more 
people moved out of the city.25 Suburban development began to fill in 
the open space, and the high demand for housing meant that land-use 
planning, quality architecture, and good suburban-urban public trans-
portation fell by the wayside. The garden suburb gave way to the 
subdivision, the shopping mall, and the freeway, and suburbanization 
began to take on a new and more ominous meaning.26 Although in-
itially envisioned as a means to escape the congestion of the city, the 
20 See FISHMAN, supra note 13, at 186 (discussing Wells' essay). 
21 [d. 
22 See id. 
23 See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 15, at 190-97. 
24 See id. 
25 See V. GAIL EASLEY, AM. PLAN. ASS'N, STAYING INSIDE THE LINES: URBAN GROWTH 
BOUNDARIES 1 (1992). "The irony, of course, is that the characteristics that initially draw people 
to the urban fringe disappear as more and more people come. The fringe becomes more dense 
and congested, and the quality of life goes down. People look to move further away, creating 
more sprawl." [d. 
26 See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 15, at 194. 
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suburbanization process eventually created its own brand of over-
growth-decentralized congestionP As Lewis Mumford observed in 
1961, "The ultimate effect of the suburban escape in our time is, 
ironically, a low-grade uniform environment from which escape is 
impossible."28 Mumford continued, "A universal suburb is almost as 
much a nightmare, humanly speaking, as a universal megalopolis; yet 
it is toward this proliferating nonentity that our present random or 
misdirected urban growth has been steadily tending."29 
Lewis Mumford's critique of suburbanization was based largely on 
aesthetic and cultural grounds, on the dull and prefabricated land-
scape it tends to create. His critique, although not at the core of my 
analysis, is closely related to this Essay's central point. There are 
identifiable reasons why cities traditionally have served as important 
cultural centers. The reasons include the face-to-face interaction of 
people from different economic classes and ethnic backgrounds, the 
architectural and historical heritage of neighborhoods and city cen-
ters, and the maintenance of parks, commons, and other public spaces. 
Land-use zoning, open space preservation, environmental liability, 
and justice-the issues addressed in this Essay-provide the legal 
framework that helps determine whether these urban amenities will 
endure or decline. 
With this historical context in place, we now can turn to the modern 
consequences of, and responses to, the exploding metropolis. Environ-
mentally and economically, the impact of suburbanization has been 
profound. Environmentally, commercial and residential development 
has now pushed deep into natural canyon, coastal, and woodland 
ecosystems, with a corresponding loss of habitat for wildlife and pub-
lic recreation areas for people.30 The conversion of surrounding farm-
land to subdivisions and industrial uses has destroyed beautiful land-
scapes and has displaced rural communities.3! The lack of adequate 
public transportation, the reliance on automobiles, and the increasing 
distance of commutes have also led to severe air pollution in many 
metropolitan areas.32 
27 See FISHMAN, supra note 13, at 157. 
28 LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATION AND ITS 
PROSPECTS 486 (1961). 
29 [d. at 496. 
30 See BEYOND SPRAWL, supra note 11, at 8; see also MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCA-
VATING THE FUTURE IN Los ANGELES 131 (1992). 
31 See GREENBELT ALLIANCE, THE BAY AREA'S FARMLANDS 17 (1991). 
32 See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, BROOKINGS INST., STUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING WITH 
PEAK-HoUR TRAFFIC CONGESTION (1992). 
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Economically, the impacts of suburbanization have been a mixed 
blessing. For the automobile and construction industries, and for the 
treasuries of many suburban municipal governments, suburbanization 
has been a boon.33 For city centers, however, it has been a disaster. 
As businesses and residents have left for the suburbs, cities have seen 
a decline in tax revenues and municipal services, and a rise in unem-
ployment and crime.34 
Although this shift in fortunes between cities and suburbs initially 
seemed justified on market grounds, it has become increasingly clear 
that this shift has also created new economic problems. As urban 
unemployment rises, the rest of society, including those in the sub-
urbs, are required to fund state and federal welfare assistance pro-
grams.35 As air quality declines, open space vanishes, and malls and 
subdivisions come to dominate the landscape, the region becomes less 
desirable vis-a-vis other regions.36 Thus, over time, the economic wel-
fare of the entire metropolitan area begins to suffer: the problems of 
the city begin to pull the suburban economy down with it. 
The economic, environmental, and political unsustainability of sub-
urban efforts to disengage from urban cores has been recognized not 
only by open space and urban poor advocates, but by the business 
community as well. In 1995, Bank of America, the largest bank in 
California and one of the largest banks in the United States, co-pub-
lished a major report entitled Beyond Sprawl.37 In this report, Bank 
of America concluded that "unchecked sprawl has shifted from an 
engine of California's growth to a force that now threatens to inhibit 
growth and degrade the quality of our life,"38 and that "allowing 
sprawl may be politically expedient in the short run, but in the long 
run will create social, environmental and political problems that we 
may not be able to solve."39 
Similarly, in 1991 the Bay Area Council, a policy organization rep-
resenting major employers and businesses in the San Francisco re-
33 See HAYWARD, supra note 12, at 10--1l. 
34 See Dean Calland, Salvaging Our Urban Brawnfields, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 5, 1995, 
at lIB. 
35 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 204. "But in the long run, gains for the nonpoor majority 
obtained at the expense of the poor minority will be outweighed by mutual losses from the 
resulting weakening of the overall metropolitan and national economies. Many non poor, how-
ever, do not recognize this reality." [d. 
36 See id. 
37 BEYOND SPRAWL, supra note 1l. 
38 [d. at 1. 
39 [d. at 2. 
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gion, published a report on growth management.40 In its report, the 
Bay Area Council argued that current growth patterns would lead to 
"economic and environmental decay" in the area, and that new strate-
gies were needed to protect open space.41 The report even went so far 
as to suggest the creation of a Bay Area Greenbelt, a ring of undevel-
oped open space surrounding the entire metropolitan area.42 
In response to the problems created by sprawl, local governments 
and communities have developed strategies to control suburban 
growth. Three of the most widely used strategies for controlling 
sprawl are slow-growth initiatives, residential lot requirements, and 
private land trustS.43 Slow-growth initiatives place an absolute per-
centage limit, or even an absolute moratorium, on the amount of new 
residential units that can be built in a given time period. Residential 
lot requirements establish rules regarding the size or type of new 
residential construction, such as only single-family homes with a mini-
mum amount of acreage. Private land trusts enable local citizens to 
purchase open space or farmland collectively, and thereby prevent 
such properties from being converted to commercial or residential 
use.44 
Slow-growth initiatives, residential lot requirements, and private 
land trusts have helped individual communities block the develop-
ment of new, less upscale, housing. However, they have not addressed 
the problems that are prompting urban flight, nor have they pre-
vented sprawl from leapfrogging over regulated slow-growth areas 
to other undeveloped and less regulated areas.45 Moreover, in many 
instances, local anti-sprawl measures were based more on a concern 
for property values than for open space preservation.46 The environ-
ment was often only a pretense for the rich to exclude the poor and 
middle classes from certain neighborhoods.47 In such situations, the 
40 See generally BAY AREA COUNCIL, FOUR REASONS WHY BAY AREA BUSINESS SHOULD 
PUSH FOR REGIONAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT (1991). 
41 See id. at 2. 
42 See id. at 3. 
43 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 31-42. 
44 See generally CALIFORNIA STATE COASTAL CONSERVANCY, EVALUATION OF AGRICUL-
TURAL LAND TRUSTS (1989). 
45 See id. 
46 See TARLOCK, supra note 16, at 482--83. "There is, however, a less attractive side to open 
space preservation. It has served to exclude poor and minorities from preexisting land uses and 
to limit housing opportunities in the suburbs." [d. 
47 See DAVIS, supra note 30, at 173. "Although the protracted struggle against the corporate 
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economic inequities initially created by sprawl were only intensified 
by local efforts to stop it. 
The U.S. experience with suburbanization and open space conver-
sion has taught environmentalists, urban poor advocates, policy mak-
ers, and the business community an important lesson. Suburbaniza-
tion may provide select individuals and companies with a short-term 
escape from the problems of urban decline, but it does not provide 
society with a long-term policy solution. Economically and environ-
mentally, the paradigm of the exploding metropolis, of suburbs geo-
graphically and politically segregating themselves from the city, can-
not be sustained.48 
II. THE UNTOUCHABLES: BROWNFIELDS UNDER SUPERFUND 
Abandoned, deteriorating property has become one of the dominant 
images of our cities. It has come to represent the ghost town quality, 
the so-called blight, of so many of our urban areas.49 The vision of the 
vacant urban lot embodies most of the elements commonly associated 
with the decline of our cities: pollution and garbage, unemployment, 
poverty, racial isolation, crime, drugs, declining public services, and 
architectural eyesores.50 
As discussed earlier, the causes of the vacant urban lot, and of urban 
decline in general, cannot be readily reduced to a single issue. While 
there may have been an initial cause or trigger, we now have reached 
a point where several factors are reinforcing the process of abandon-
ment, decay, and disinvestment.51 One of the most significant factors 
in this process is the liability associated with properties that are 
exploitation of the mountains had injected environmental issues into city politics, the hillside 
homeowners were still caricaturable as limousine conservations." Id. 
48 See Bradley Inman, Greenbelts to Tighten Urban Limit Lines, S.F. EXAMINER, May 6, 1990, 
at B16. 
49 See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 15. 
Id. 
Vacant land is a common sight in virtually every American city. Scattered among 
houses in residential areas, especially in distressed neighborhoods, small and large 
vacant, trash-filled lots contribute to an appearance of deterioration and blight. Count-
less abandoned factories and warehouses-some with decaying buildings, others 
cleared of structures but containing hazardous wastes in their soil and groundwater-
mar waterfronts and old industrial corridors. Derelict railroads, canals, docks, housing 
projects, and landfills ail add to the growing acreage of urban land left unoccupied and 
untended. 
50 See Stefanie B. Goldberg, Let's Make a Deal: Cooperation, Not Litigation Is the Newest 
Way to Clean Up Urban Wastelands, ABA J., Mar. 1997, at 42-43. 
61 See Brian C. Walsh, Seeding the Brownjields: A Proposed Statute Limiting Environmental 
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perceived to be, or are in fact, contaminated with hazardous materi-
als.52 
Liability for the cleanup of contaminated property is established 
primarily under federal and state environmental laws.53 The most 
far-reaching of these laws is the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental 
Responses, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).54 CERCLA 
is often referred to as Superfund, after the revolving cleanup trust 
fund established under the law. Most of the state hazardous waste 
cleanup laws were based largely on the federal Superfund model.55 
Therefore, by examining Superfund we can observe how environ-
mental liability laws in general are affecting the use or abandonment 
of urban properties. 
The core objective of CERCLA is to identify parties responsible 
for contaminating property, and then to require these parties to pay, 
or reimburse the government, usually the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), directly for the costs of environmental remediation.56 
CERCLA refers to persons who are subject to remediation liability 
as potentially responsible parties (PRPs). On its face, CERCLA ap-
pears to be a workable and appropriate piece of legislation; a straight-
forward law based on the polluter pays principle, which holds that the 
burden of cleanup should fall on the shoulders of those who pollute.57 
In practice, however, CERCLA has proven difficult and somewhat 
dysfunctional. 58 
CERCLNs troubles can be traced in part to the expansive inter-
pretations of the term PRP, and PRP remediation liability, adopted 
by EPA and the courtS.59 These expansive interpretations resulted in 
the following liability rules: (1) strict liability, in which intent or 
Liability for Prospective Purchasers, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 198 (1997). "Looming environ-
mental liability is not the only factor contributing to the brownfields problem; other significant 
factors include perceptions of crime, tax rates, municipal services, and possibly racism." Id. 
52 See Ravi Arulanantham & Steven Morse, Brownjields ... Everybody's Doing It, 5 ENV'T 
L. NEWS 1, 5--£ (1996). 
53 See BOYD ET AL., supra note 9, at 7-8. 
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
55 See Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the Environ-
mental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 CONN. L. REV. 789, 790--91 
(1995) (referring to state hazardous waste liability laws as "little CERCLAs"). 
56 See Charles de Saillan, In Praise of Superfund, 35 ENV'T 42, 42 (1993). 
57 See DAVID PEARCE & R. KERRY TuRNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 173, 175 (1990). 
58 See Senator John H. Chafee, Superfund Reform: Use Brownfields to Save Green Ones, 
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., July 2, 1996, at B04. 
59 See Walsh, supra note 51, at 194. 
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negligence were not required to impose remediation liability on a 
PRP;60 (2) joint and several liability, in which a party who contributed 
a small portion of the pollution could be responsible for the entire cost 
ofremediation;61 (3) lender liability, in which banks and lending insti-
tutions that influenced the management decisions of property owners 
could be subject to PRP liability;62 (4) retroactive liability, in which a 
party could be subject to PRP liability notwithstanding that its haz-
ardous waste disposal practices were legal at the time the disposal 
occurred;63 and (5) open-ended liability, in which a party was uncer-
tain as to when remediation was completed, or what cleanup stand-
ards would satisfy its remediation responsibilities.64 
Although CERCLA's expansive liability rules were intended to 
facilitate comprehensive and speedy cleanup of contaminated sites, 
often this was not the result. Frequently, the liability for PRPs was 
so extensive that parties found it cheaper to litigate for years rather 
than to pay for remediation.55 Frequently, the specter of lender liabil-
ity meant that banks would refuse to foreclose on loans, and proper-
ties would be abandoned.66 Frequently, investors and banks would 
60 See DAVID CARPENTER, ROBERT CUSHMAN & BRUCE ROZONOWSKI, ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISPUTE HANDBOOK: LIABILITY AND CLAIMS 31-32 (1991). "[CERCLA] imposed strict liability, 
without regard to fault, on certain broadly defined categories of persons who either owned or 
operated the sites that became the subject of government removal or remedial action, or who 
either generated or transported the hazardous substances that were disposed of in these sites." 
Id. 
6! See CARPENTER, CUSHMAN & ROZONOWSKI, supra note 60, at 189 (Volume II). 
Id. 
Early case law under CERCLA established that joint and several liability, even though 
not expressly authorized by the statute, could be imposed on the four types of PRPs. 
Under joint and several liability, each defendant is liable for the entire harm, not just 
the harm for which it is proximately responsible. 
62 See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that lenders could be held liable for environmentalJhazardous waste remediation if they partici-
pated sufficiently in a company's management). EPA issued a regulation that sought to limit the 
Fleet Factors holding, but this regulation was found to be inconsistent with CERCLA's liability 
scheme. See Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 F.3d 1107, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
63 See CARPENTER, CUSHMAN & ROZONOWSKI, supra note 60, at 356. "[CERCLA] is unprece· 
dented, in that liability for environmental cleanup is being mandated for businesses even wher 
prior handling and disposal activities were conducted using methods which constituted perfectl~ 
acceptable practices within the legal and regulatory framework of those times .... The retroac 
tivity implication of Superfund have cast a cloud of uncertainty over business conduct withiJ 
the private sector of the U.S. economy." Id. See also United States v. Northeastern Pharm. I 
Chem. Co. Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986). 
64 See BOYD ET AL., supra note 9, at 10. See generally Frederick W. Addison, Reopem 
Liability Under Section 122 of CERCLA: "From Here to Eternity," 45 Sw. L.J. 1081 (1991). 
65 See Superfund as a Threat, ENVTL. F. July-Aug. 1994, at 15. 
66 See generally Scott Wilsdon, Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Again 
Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1987). 
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refuse to redevelop contaminated property, or even property that 
might be contaminated, for fear of becoming a PRP.67 Frequently, 
landowners would avoid undertaking a preliminary environmental 
assessment of their property, because such an assessment could un-
earth information that might trigger PRP liability.68 
Under the above liability scenario, environmental lawyers and re-
mediation consultants made substantial profits. Despite the enormous 
activity surrounding CERCLA's implementation, however, there 
often was a disturbing lack of activity on the actual remediation 
front.69 Lawyers and consultants were hired to help determine CER-
CLA remediation liability, but much of their work never translated 
into tangible cleanup of contaminated properties.70 
The subject matter of CERCLA, the polluted sites, generally re-
mained just that-polluted sites. Especially in former industrial ur-
ban areas, the American landscape remained littered with abandoned, 
contaminated properties.71 Although CERCLA environmentalliabil-
ity certainly was not the only factor contributing to this situation, it 
nonetheless helped to deepen the post-industrial economic decline in 
many city neighborhoods.72 From an investment and business stand-
point, these abandoned properties, or brownfields, became untouch-
ables. 
Abandoned brownfields tended to drag surrounding properties and 
communities down with them, thereby reinforcing the decline cycle.73 
67 See Charles Bartsch, Financing Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment, NE-MW ECON. 
REV., June 1995, at 4. 
68 BOYD ET AL., supra note 9, at 25. 
For this reason, it may be in the interest of those who currently own brownfields 
properties to withhold them from the market. The increased probability of detection 
that accompanies a sale in effect imposes the property transfer tax that can lead to 
deadweight losses in brownfield property markets. This distortion underlies the fol-
lowing type of complaint, made in arguments for a recent environmental liability 
reform initiative in the Pennsylvania Senate: "Companies in Pittsburgh, Johnstown 
and other communities have deliberately let industrial property stand idle indefinitely 
rather than even look to see what contamination might exist because they were afraid 
to deal with state environmental agencies." 
Id. (quoting Clean Up Pollution, Protect Farmland, Create Jobs: How a Sensible Industrial 
Site Recycling Policy Will Benefit Pennsylvania (PRESS RELEASE, PENNSYLVANIA SENATORS 
BRIGHTBILL, MUSTO, STEWART, AND SHAFFER), Apr. 1, 1993)). 
69 See Superfund as a Threat, supra note 65, at 15. EPA "now spends only about 45 percent 
of its Superfund monies on core activities, such as waste removal and remedication. The rest 
goes for administrative oversight, studies, design, investigation, monitoring, enforcement, and 
legal costs." ENV'T WK., July 21, 1997, at 345. 
70 See ENV'T WK., supra note 69, at 345-46. 
7! See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 15. 
72 See id. at 57. 
73 See, e.g., John Carey, Urban Fields of Dreams, Bus. WK., May 27, 1996, at 80-86. See also 
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As discussed earlier in this Essay, the increase in untouchable 
brownfields also encouraged suburban sprawl and the destruction of 
open space.74 This pattern of metropolitan expansion only further 
diminished the economic resources and political power of many cities. 
The point here is not to blame CERCLA for the woes of post-in-
dustrial urban America. Rather, the point is simply to demonstrate 
the particular role that environmental liability rules played in divert-
ing investment and economic development away from our cities. 
In response to the economic and environmental problems relating 
to PRP liability rules, there have been some attempts to reform 
CERCLA. The first significant attempt to reform CERCLA was the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986.75 
Among other things, SARA sought to establish a viable "innocent 
landowner defense" for parties who purchased real property after 
contamination occurred.76 Under SARA's provisions, a purchaser 
would not be liable for remediation costs if the party could demon-
strate that it "did not know nor had reason to know" of the hazardous 
waste contamination when the party acquired the property.77 The 
objective of this language was to provide the prospective purchaser 
with sufficient protection, or immunity, so that polluted properties 
could be redeveloped. 
Due to inconsistent interpretations of the innocent landowner de-
fense, however, SARA did not achieve this goal. More specifically, 
EPA and the courts did not clearly establish what the prospective 
purchaser must do, in terms in environmental investigation, to dem-
onstrate that it "did not know nor had reason to know" of existing 
contamination.78 In the absence of such specific criteria, SARA's pro-
tections could not be relied upon. As one commentator explained, in 
KARL LINN, URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, FROM RUBBLE TO RESTORATION 2 (1994). "The loss 
of an economic base has left many cities with extensive areas of unused land. Acre upon acre of 
vacant litter strewn land symbolizes many cities as places of desolation and decay in the mind~ 
of residents and visitors alike." Id. at 2. 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 11-48. 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1994). 
76 The origins of CERCLA's innocent landowner defense can be traced to 42 U.S.C 
§ 9607(b)(3), which establishes a third party defense. SARA sought to clarify and expand thi 
third party defense. 
7742 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1994). 
78 See generally Phillip B. Rarick, The Superfund Due Diligence Problems: The Flaws in tJ 
ASTM Proposal and an Alternative Approach, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10505 (1991); see also In 1 
Hemingway Transp., 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. A & N Cleaners & LaundE 
ers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D. N.Y. 1992); United States v. Serafini, 791 F. Supp. 107 (M. 
Pa. 1990); United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 198 
1998] ESSAY 603 
practice CERCLA's innocent landowner defense turned out to be 
more of a mirage than an oasis.79 As a result, acquisition and redevel-
opment of polluted properties did not occur, and the untouchables 
remained largely untouched. 
The second major wave of CERCLA reform, EPA's Brownfields 
Action Agenda (EPA Agenda), began near the end of President Clin-
ton's first term.SO The EPA Agenda emerged from the ashes of the 
proposed 1994 Superfund Reform Act (SRA), a Clinton-sponsored bill 
which Congress did not pass. In the absence of strong congressional 
action, the focus of CERCLA reform shifted to the administrative 
arena.S! What could not be achieved through broad-based legislation 
would now be attempted through a package of agency policies and 
operating procedures.82 
Prior to the EPA Agenda, the term brownfield generally held a 
negative meaning, both environmentally and investment-wise. It re-
ferred to former industrial properties that were now unused due 
to uncertainty over environmental remediaton liability.sa EPA's pro-
gram sought to transform this meaning, to change the language of 
brownfields from talk of obstacles to talk of opportunity. An April 
1996 report issued by EPA reflects this shift: "Implementation of the 
Brownfields Action Agenda will help reverse the spiral of unad-
dressed contamination, declining property values and increased un-
employment often found in inner city industrial areas."84 As such, the 
Washington v. TIme Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988); BCW Assocs. v. Occidental 
Chern. Corp., 1988 WL 102641 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
79 See generally L. Jager Smith, CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage?, 
18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155 (1993). 
80 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE BROWNFIELDS ACTION AGENDA 1 (Apr. 
1996) [hereinafter EPA AGENDA]. 
81 See William Keener, Brownfields-The United States EPA's Policy and Legal Responses, 
LAND-USE AND ENV'T F., at 1~5 (Summer 1995). As EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
"struggled to respond individually to each of these requests, it pinned its hopes on the Clinton 
Administration's 1994 Superfund Reform Act (SRA) ... [al]though the bill failed to pass in the 
last week of the 103rd Congress." Id. at 144. "In the wake of SRA's demise, the EPA is not 
sitting still, waiting for a new version of SRA to hit the President's desk. The EPA is pushing 
ahead with its own program to implement some of that taken from SRA. Known as the 
'CERCLA administrative reform,' they include a package of policies that encourages economic 
development of real estate under the umbrella of the EPA's brownfields action agenda." Id. at 
145. 
82 See id. 
83 See Thndro, supra note 55, at 789-90. Terry T. Thndro defines brownfields as "productive 
property now unused due to uncertainty over who bears the responsibility for undertaking 
environmental cleanup." Id. 
84 EPA AGENDA, supra note 80, at 1. 
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EPA Agenda suggested that the brownfields issue was not just about 
limiting the liability of banks and real estate developers; it was also 
about providing inner-city residents with a strategy to improve the 
economy and environmental health of their communities.85 
In terms of CERCLA implementation, the EPA Agenda called for 
several changes in agency policy and operating procedures. These 
changes included, among other things, (1) CERCLIS delisting, in 
which EPA removed over 25,000 properties from the national track-
ing list of contaminated sites;86 (2) prospective purchaser agreements, 
in which EPA agreed not to sue new owners for environmental reme-
diation costs for contamination that occurred prior to purchase;87 (3) 
comfort letters, in which EPA set forth its remediation goals regard-
ing formerly federally owned property;88 (4) land-use restrictions, in 
which new owners agreed to limit future use to commercial and in-
dustrial purposes in exchange for EPA's release of remediation liabil-
ity; (5) national and regional brownfields pilots, in which EPA pro-
vided grants to states and local governments to help promote 
environmental cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated proper-
ties;89 and (6) Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credits, in which 
federal guidelines were changed to permit banks to fulfill CRA's lo-
cal-lending obligations by providing loans for environmental remedia-
tion and brownfields redevelopment.90 
In addition to the EPA Agenda's administrative reforms, Congress 
recently passed legislation that could provide further liability protec-
tions for banks and other lending institutions. The 1996 Asset Con-
servation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act 
(part of the Omnibus Appropriations Act), signed into law by Presi-
85 See URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, supra note 7, at 1-2. "While the EPA initiative has put 
brownfields redevelopment on the agenda of almost every government entity, developing a 
coordinated approach to urban revitalization that places inner city-based community groups on 
the same footing as private and public initiatives is crucial .... " ld. 
BS CERCLIS is short for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & 
Liability Information System, the EPA database/inventory of potential hazardous waste sites. 
See EPA AGENDA, supm note 80, at 5. See also Elizabeth M. Weaver, New Life for Brownfields: 
Contaminated Sites Can Be Successfully Redeveloped, HOUSE COUNSEL MAG., Winter 1997, at 
25. 
87 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, LIABILITY AND OTHER GUIDANCES 1 (Mar. 1996). 
88 See EPA AGENDA, supra note 80, at 7 (discussing Model Comfort Letter for Transfers of 
Federally Owned Property). 
89 See generally OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS NATIONAL PILOTS (June 1996) [hereinafter CRA Credits]. 
90 See id. 
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dent Clinton on September 20, 1996, creates a new "lender exemp-
tion" under CERCLA.91 This exemption permits a bank or lender to 
take certain specified actions to protect its security interest in a 
contaminated property without triggering Superfund's PRP liability. 
These exempt actions include foreclosure, resale and leasing of the 
premises.92 Although there still remain many pre-foreclosure actions 
that could trigger PRP liability, especially lender actions that might 
influence how a landowner manages environmental problems on a 
given site, the federal legislation does provide greater clarity and 
certainty. At least in regard to the actions specifically exempted, 
banks and other lending institutions should be better able to deter-
mine their potential remediation liability.93 
As discussed earlier, CERCLA is not the only law that creates 
liability for the cleanup of contaminated properties. There are laws in 
virtually every state that establish CERCLA-type liability schemes 
for environmental remediation.94 The policy debates around brown-
fields reclamation therefore have focused not only on CERCLA, but 
on state hazardous waste laws as well.95 
III. ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: RECLAMATION 
FOR WHOM? 
As the previous sections on open space conversion and brownfields 
reveal, metropolitan land-use and hazardous waste remediation are 
closely linked to the fate of the urban poor. Because the urban poor 
often tend to be people of color, frequently African-American or Lat-
ino citizens, these issues also raise difficult questions of equity and 
justice. How does the location of contaminated sites, and the rules 
governing environmental liability, impact the economic and health 
conditions in communities of color? Do the negative economic and en-
vironmental consequences of open space conversion affect all ethnic 
groups equally? Will brownfields reclamation provide tangible 
benefits, in terms of economic development or environmental quality, 
91 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)-(G) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n) (1994). 
92 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)(ii). 
93 See Maurine C. Padden, Thxic Liability Reformfor Lenders and Fiduciaries, 15 CAL. REAL 
PROP. J. 15,25 (1997). 
94 See BOYD ET AL., supra note 9, at 7-8. "Superfund is only one element of a greater 
patchwork of legal rules and regulations that can create uncertain liability for property own-
ers .... Property owners who are not liable under CERCLA may nevertheless be liable under 
state law." [d. 
95 See id. 
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for the communities where brownfields are located, or will reclama-
tion mostly benefit investors from outside the communities? 
The questions presented above all fall within the larger policy issue 
of what is now generally called "environmental justice."96 The envi-
ronmental justice movement is based on the growing recognition that 
poor communities and minority popUlations are subject to dispropor-
tionately high health and environmental risks.97 Government policies 
that have either encouraged or ignored this disproportionate alloca-
tion of risks have been classified justifiably as examples of environ-
mental racism.98 The goal of the environmental justice movement is 
to ensure that environmental protection policies benefit all citizens, 
not just the white and the rich, by empowering disadvantaged com-
munities and educating and pressuring government agencies.99 
From both a racial and an environmental standpoint, environmental 
justice is a significant, and arguably a long-overdue, development. The 
movement represents the convergence of two agendas that tradition-
ally had little interest in or understanding of each other-civil rights 
and environmental protection. lOo More specifically, it forced the envi-
ronmental movement to confront some of the racist and class-driven 
aspects of its political platform. Environmentalists had come to con-
sider environmental protection as something distinct from, or some-
thing above, the struggle for justice and equity.lol By demonstrating 
that levels of environmental protection were closely related to citi-
96 See generally William A. Shutkin & Charles P. Lord, Environmental Law, Environmental 
Justice and Democracy, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1117 (1994). 
97 See Ann Bastian & Dana Alston, Writing Our Own History: New Developments in the 
Environmental Justice Movement, 5 RACE, POVERTY & THE ENV'T 8,8 (1994-1995). "Environ-
mental justice struggles have been around a long time, but they only gained self-consciousness 
and recognition as a movement over the last few years. Broadly defined, this movement links 
grassroots activism around environmental protection to issues of economic development, social 
equality and community empowerment." Id; see also Thmas Aragon & Kevin Grumbach, Bay-
view Hunters Point Community Health and Environment Check Up (May 17, 1997) (document-
ing different health risks in predominantly white versus predominantly minority neighborhoods 
in San Francisco). 
98 See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor and Poisoned: Minority Grassroots 
Environmentalists and the Questfor Eco-Justice, 1 RAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 69, 69 (1991). 
99 See Preamble, in Principles of Environmental Justice (adopted at the First National People 
of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, Washington, D.C., Oct. 1991). 
100 See generally Alice L. Brown, Environmental Justice and Civil Rights, 5 RACE, POVERTY 
& THE ENV'T 39 (1994-1995). 
101 For a comprehensive discussion of the environmental movement's failure to respond to 
issues of equity and racism see MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL-
ISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE 'l\vENTIETH CENTURY (1995). 
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zens' race and wealth, environmental justice advocates laid bare the 
falsity of this position. 102 
By the time EPA began developing its Brownfields Action Agenda, 
the environmental justice movement was already in high gear. For 
several years, disadvantaged communities had begun to organize 
around health and environmental issues, and had managed to force 
changes in government and corporate policy.103 Several successful 
environmental justice lawsuits and administrative challenges had 
been filed. 104 Additionally, President Clinton took two actions that 
helped raise the political profile of the movement. First, on September 
30,1993, he established the National Environmental Justice Advisory 
Council (NEJAC) to provide independent advice, consultations, and 
recommendations to the EPA Administrator on environmental justice 
matters.105 Second, on February 11, 1994, President Clinton issued 
Executive Order 12,898, entitled Federal Actions to Address Envi-
ronmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Popu-
lations.106 
Given these developments in the area of environmental justice, the 
push for brownfields reclamation was met with both anticipation and 
skepticism. On the one hand, brownfields reclamation provided an 
opportunity to clean up and improve economic and environmental 
102 See Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 
1992, at S2. 
103 See generally Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The 
Needfor Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992) (explaining why real action, 
and real successes, in environmental justice happen at community level, not in courtroom 
because filing suit is often an indication of failure at community organizing level). 
104 See Luke Cole, Lawyers, the Law & Environmental Justice: Dangers for the Movement, 5 
RACE, POVERTY & THE ENV'T 3, 3 (1994-1995). 
[d. 
Community groups, environmental and civil rights organizations, and private attor-
neys have filed dozens of lawsuits in community struggles for environmental justice in 
the last five years. Some of these lawsuits have been suits using environmental law, 
some have been straight up civil rights suits, some have been interesting blends of 
these two disciplines .... Many of these suits have been successful, and the legal piece 
to the environmental justice movement is becoming every more sophisticated .... The 
legal struggle has moved beyond the courtroom, as well. More than 20 administrative 
complaints under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging environmental 
racism, have been filed with U.S. EPA in the past 15 months, with more being filed 
each month. 
105 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 
THE MODEL PLAN FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION ii (Nov. 1996). 
100 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
(1994). 
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conditions in many poor and minority neighborhoods.107 On the other 
hand, brownfields reclamation also called for less stringent cleanup 
standards and shielding banks and investors from remediation liabil-
ity.los Furthermore, there were no guarantees that the new jobs made 
possible by reclamation would go to the people who lived in the 
communities where brownfields were located.loo Thus, it was possible 
that brownfields reclamation could lead to a continuation or worsening 
of health and economic conditions in poor and minority neighborhoods. 
Skepticism about brownfields reclamation was based on more than 
environmental justice concerns. It was based on the negative experi-
ences of many communities with urban renewal policies. During the 
1960s, state and federal governments implemented many programs 
aimed at improving housing and economic development in inner cit-
ies.110 On the whole, these programs failed to achieve their goals.111 
The housing projects often tended to isolate and stigmatize poor, 
minority populations,· and thus led to increased segregation and 
crime.112 The renovation of older neighborhoods often resulted in gen-
trification, in which neighborhood residents were priced out of their 
own communities.113 The economic development programs often fo-
cused on businesses that, for reasons of both racism and work skills, 
did not hire from the community.114 Thus, the jobs that were created 
did not benefit inner-city residents. As one observer put it, "urban 
renewal means negro removal."115 
Many suspected that the 1990s brownfields agenda would be a 
repeat of the 1960s urban renewal experience. Olin Webb, a construc-
107 See Goldberg, supra note 50, at 42. 
I~ See Tondro, supra note 55, at 801 ("Differential clean-up standards, if set at a lower level 
than some 'ideal' standard, can readily be characterized as continuing this discrimination against 
poor and minority communities, shifting to them part of the costs of cleaning up Brownfields 
.... "). 
109 See Alan Edson, Presentation at the Conference on Community Development and Envi-
ronmental Restoration: The Language and Practice of Brownfields Redevelopment in San 
Francisco (May 10, 1997). ("Local Communities are concerned that the brownfields movement 
is really about a 'one shot deal,' where minority populations are given jobs to build businesses 
and housing, and not the jobs to work or live there.") 
110 See RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 15, at 172. 
III See generally MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1949-1962 (1964). 
112 See m. 
113 See Tarlock, supra note 16, at 481. 
114 Interview with Alan Edson of the African American Development Association and Olin 
Webb of the Bayview-Hunters Point Contractors Association (conducted Feb. 10, 1997). 
116 See Editorial, Bringing New Life to a Troubled Area, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1994, at A18. 
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tion engineer and long-time resident of the Bayview-Hunters Point 
neighborhood in San Francisco, expressed these concerns poignantly. 
Bayview-Hunters Point contains numerous contaminated and aban-
doned properties, and a majority of its residents are minorities.u6 The 
neighborhood has therefore been a focal point for government and 
private sector brownfield initiatives in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
Many of these initiatives have been portrayed by government and 
investors as community redevelopment projects. Mr. Webb, however, 
views these initiatives as part of a longer and more disturbing pat-
tern: 
As far as I'm concerned, a brownfield is just a Superfund site. 
African-Americans bore the brunt of the poison and pollution 
when they were Superfund sites, but now they are not going to 
be a part of cleanup and redevelopment. From my neighborhood's 
perspective, brownfields redevelopment means that African-
Americans are being passed over and moved out.1l7 
As discussed in the previous section on CERCLA reform efforts, 
EPA began developing its Brownfields Action Agenda in early 1995, 
after Congress failed to pass the 1994 Superfund Reform Act.u8 By 
early 1995, the environmental justice movement had become a pow-
erful political force, and President Clinton had issued his 1994 Execu-
tive Order on Environmental Justice.u9 Thus, at least at the level of 
government policy, environmental justice and brownfields reclama-
tion became major political priorities at a similar point in time. 
The concurrent political ascendance of environmental justice and 
brownfield issues forced the Clinton Administration to develop new 
strategies to handle this emerging policy nexus. In terms of a best-
case scenario, the Clinton Administration sought to stitch the two 
movements together-to integrate equity, environmental cleanup, 
and economic revitalization into one coherent and mutually reinforc-
ing policy agenda. In terms of damage control, the Clinton Admini-
stration wanted to avoid a situation where the environmental justice 
and brownfields agendas were in visible contradiction, mutually un-
dermining each other. 
116 See Jane Kay, Pollution Fears Stir Activists in Hunters Point, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 26, 
1996, at AI; see also Clifford Rechtschaffen, Fighting Back Against a Power Plant: Some 
Lessons From the Legal and Organizing Efforts of the Bayview-Hunters Point Community, 3 
HASTINGS W. N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 407, 408 (1996). 
117 Edson and Webb Interview, supra note 114. 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 80--82. 
119 See supra text accompanying note 106. 
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The Clinton Administration's first significant effort to integrate 
environmental justice and brownfields policies took place in the con-
text of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee 
(NEJAC), created in 1993 to advise EPA,120 In 1995, NEJAC's Waste 
and Facility Siting Subcommittee and EPA cosponsored a series of 
public dialogues entitled Public Dialogues on Urban Revitalization 
and Brownfields: Envisioning Healthy and Sustainable Communi-
ties. l2l The dialogues were held in five cities (Boston, Philadelphia, 
Detroit, Oakland, and Atlanta) and were intended to provide a forum 
to discuss EPA's plans to adopt new administrative policies to help 
encourage the redevelopment of contaminated urban properties.122 
NEJAC's public dialogues involved persons from varied backgrounds 
and with varied objectives. Among those who participated were rep-
resentatives from community groups, government agencies, religious 
groups, unions, universities, banks, and philanthropies.123 
Although the NEJAC dialogues revealed that there was broad 
interest in the issue of brownfields, they also revealed the profound 
gulf in both objectives and language that existed between different 
stakeholders.124 Every participant in the NEHAC dialogues used the 
word "redevelopment," but the term clearly meant different things to 
different people. For the real estate investors and banks, redevelop-
ment meant removing the liability risks associated with property 
transactions at sites where there were toxic contamination con-
cerns.125 For environmental justice advocates, redevelopment meant 
ensuring that health conditions and the economic self-reliance of poor, 
inner-city residents were improved, not worsened, by brownfields 
reclamation.126 
120 For a discussion of NEJAC, see supra text accompanying note 105. 
121 See URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN REVITALIZATION, 
AND BROWNFIELDS: THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE 1 (1995). 
122 See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
Concerns were raised [at the NEJAC dialogues) by members of the public about the 
Brownfields Initiative, i.e., whether or not the brownfields issue was a smoke screen 
for gutting cleanup standards, environmental regulations, and liability safeguards. 
Heretofore, public policy discourse around the brownfields issue has revolved around 
removing barriers to real estate and investment transactions at sites where there 
exists toxic contamination concerns-real or perceived. 
URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, supra note 121, at 1. 
126 See id. at ii. "Environmental justice and brownfields are inextricably linked. All stakeholder 
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The divisions that emerged at the 1995 NEJAC dialogues have 
continued to define the evolution of the brownfields issue. In the San 
Francisco Bay Area, for instance, many of the local participants in the 
Oakland NEJAC dialogue went on to form the San Francisco Bay 
Area Regional Brownfields Working Group (SF Brownfields Working 
Group).l27 Although the group includes members from the lending, 
business, and regulatory communities, the main foci of the group's 
work are to promote environmental justice in the context of the 
brownfields issue, and to strengthen community leadership and par-
ticipation in efforts to redevelop contaminated properties.128 
To help advance these environmental justice goals, in May of 1997 
the SF Brownfields Working Group organized a workshop entitled 
Community Development & Environmental Restoration: The Lan-
guage & Practice of Brownfields Redevelopment. Unlike the 1995 
NEJAC dialogues, the SF Brownfields Working Group workshop was 
not designed to help EPA formulate new hazardous waste remedia-
tion policies. Rather, the goal of the 1997 workshop was to educate 
community leaders on existing government policies and lend-
ing/financing options in the brownfields area.129 It provided informa-
tion on how local non-profits and small businesses can take the lead, 
and leverage resources, to clean up sites and put them back into 
productive use. As such, the focus of the workshop was on helping 
neighborhoods become the initiators, rather than the victims, of 
brownfields reclamation. 
At the same time as groups like the SF Brownfields Working Group 
are pushing ahead on the environmental justice front, other stake-
holders are seeking to frame the brownfields issues in terms of pure 
investment opportunities. For instance, in March of 1997, a new na-
tional magazine, Brownfield News, was launched in Chicago. The mag-
azine proclaims itself to be "The Source of the Distressed Property 
groups must recognize that the inescapable context for discussion of the brownfields issue is 
environmental justice and urban revitalization." [d. 
127 The author is a member of the San Francisco Bay Area Brownfields Working Group, and 
therefore the discussion that follows is based largely on the author's experience with the group. 
128 See URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA REGIONAL 
BROWNFIELDS WORKING GROUP: REDEVELOPMENT GOALS, PRINCIPLES AND ACTIVITIES TO 
DATE 1 (1996). 
129 See Community Development & Environmental Restoration: A Workshop on the Lan-
guage & Practice of Brownfields Redevelopment (1997) (mailing flyer from the San Francisco 
Bay Area Brownfields Working Group) (on file with author). "The workshop will focus on ways 
in which community leaders and community groups can capture the resources necessary to 
move a brownfields redevelopment project forward." [d. 
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Market," and contains articles on industrial real estate forecasts, in-
vestor insurance coverage, strategies to reduce expenditures on en-
vironmental cleanup, and new legislative proposals to reduce investor 
and lender liability.130 In the pages of Brownfield News, one is not 
likely to find discussion of economic equity, public participation, or 
environmental racism. These issues simply fall outside the investment 
scope of the publication. 
The point here is not to portray the SF Brownfields Working Group 
and Brownfield News as two opposite ends on a spectrum of good and 
evil. Clearly, environmental justice advocates need to access and lev-
erage private capital to achieve their community empowerment 
goals.131 Local non profits and government agencies can take the lead 
in defining how neighborhood redevelopment should proceed, but only 
the private sector can provide the financial resources to make these 
plans work.132 Given that the private sector will be the ultimate engine 
of brownfields reclamation, much of the information presented in 
Brownfield News could be used to further the environmental justice 
agenda. It could be viewed as a tool for helping communities take 
control of their economic and environmental future. 
Despite the potential confluence of interests, however, environ-
mental justice advocates remain wary of the lending and investment 
communities' growing role in brownfields redevelopment.133 As with 
urban renewal in the 1960s, there is concern that the brownfields issue 
is being economically and politically hijacked by interests that have 
no connection with, or true concern about, the communities they claim 
to be helping. In the language of investors and lenders, struggling 
communities and poisoned citizens can be readily reduced to the term 
"distressed property market," a market in which profit alone becomes 
the governing redevelopment principle.134 
In the brownfields debate, environmental justice advocates have 
posed a critical question: Can there be a commitment to urban neigh-
borhoods, economic equity, and public health when remediation policy 
130 See generally BROWNFIELD NEWS, Mar. 1997, at 1. 
131 See Edson and Webb Interview, supra note 114. 
132 See id. 
133 See Tondro, supra note 55, at 801 ("The rapidly developing concern for environmental 
equity is the wild card in any effort to cut the costs of remediating contaminated land."). 
134 See Evan C. Henry & Randy A. Mueller, Banking on Praperties: Brownfields Financing-
Financial Institution Consideration/or the Private Sector, BROWNFIELD NEWS, May 1997, at 
20 ("[I)n the financial community's language there are only two words: dollars and cents."). 
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and investment are driven by profit alone?l35 The answer to this 
question will impact citizens and communities across the nation. 
IV. BEYOND THE NEXUS: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM 
The origins of suburban sprawl, toxic contamination, and inner-city 
decline are complex. Given this complexity, there are no simple policy 
solutions to these problems. The scope and interrelatedness of the 
issues do not lend themselves to tidy, reductionist answers. 
While there may not be simple solutions, there are nonetheless 
specific and important policy steps that can be taken to improve the 
situation. Particularly in the areas of metropolitan land governance 
and the remediation regulatory framework, there are policy options 
that can and should be pursued. 
In the area of metropolitan land governance, there needs to be a 
recognition that our municipal governments often lack the legal ca-
pacity to deal with the problems facing our cities.l36 Jurisdiction over 
land regulation generally exists at the county level, yet the problems 
of open space loss and inner-city disinvestment frequently operate on 
a larger metropolitan scale.l37 As long as land-use planning, property 
taxes, and municipal services are handled by county governments, 
different counties will lack either the means or the incentive to deal 
with metropolitan-wide land-use problems.l3s 
Illustrations of the inadequacy of current metropolitan governance 
are easy enough to find. A county that chooses to protect open space 
generally cannot prevent a neighboring county from encouraging 
135 See URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, supra note 7, at 1-2. 
Id. 
The environmental justice movement has been instrumental in focusing brownfields 
issues to address economic development and urban revitalization as central to the 
nation's economic and environmental future. By placing the intersection of race and 
environmental degradation at the center of the agenda of environmental protection, 
brownfields redevelopment has the potential to address the social, economic and envi-
ronmental needs of multicultural urban communities in tandem with the regional needs 
for land use reform. 
136 See Myron Orfield, Metropolitics: Coalitions for Regional Reform, BROOKINGS REV., Win-
ter 1997, at 8. 
137 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 31. "Each jurisdiction tends to adopt policies designed to 
benefit its own residents and disregards their effects on the rest of the metropolitan area. This 
parochial viewpoint causes serious discrepancies between the welfare of individual communities 
and that of the entire metropolitan area." Id. 
138 See URBAN VACANT LAND, supra note 6, at 65. "Those interested in the root cause of urban 
abandonment should look beyond the limits of the central city and seek ways to engage in 
region-wide planning efforts that transcend jurisdictional boundaries." Id. 
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sprawl, and adding to traffic and air pollution.139 Inner-city counties 
containing large numbers of contaminated properties cannot require 
that surrounding suburban counties help fund remediation. In many 
metropolitan areas, there is no way to ensure the availability of af-
fordable housing to middle and lower income residents, because each 
county is seeking to upgrade its tax base.14o 
The inadequacy of metropolitan governance is particularly acute in 
the land-use area. As Joe Bodovitz of California Environmental Trust, 
a non-governmental organization focused on growth-management is-
sues, observed: 
Sustainable environmental planning comes down to three basic 
elements: land, air and water. In the. Bay Area, the Regional 
Water Quality Control Board has the region-wide institutional 
capacity to deal with water quality and the nine-county Bay Area 
Air Quality Management District has the institutional capacity to 
deal with air quality. The problem is that there is no region-wide 
institution with the capacity to adequately deal with land, and 
without the land element, the environmental quality of the Bay 
Area cannot be preserved.14l 
In 1991, state legislation was introduced in California that would 
have helped establish the foundation for meaningful metropolitan 
governance in the San Francisco Bay Area. The proposed legislation 
called for the consolidation of three existing regional institutions and 
agencies, the Association of Bay Area Governments, the Bay Area 
Air Quality Management District, and the Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Commission, into one governmental entity called the Regional 
Commission.l42 Proponents of the Regional Commission legislation 
also envisioned that two other regional bodies, the Regional Water 
Quality Control Board and the Bay Conservation and Development 
Commission, could later be integrated into the new comprehensive 
metropolitan entity.l43 
139 See BAY AREA COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 2. 
140 See id. 
141 Interview with Joe Bodovitz (conducted Mar. 7, 1997). 
142 See S. 797, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1991). 
143 See BAY VISION 2020 COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 16 (1991). 
The merger would link, in one agency with one governing board, responsibility for 
regional air quality, regional transportation, and regional aspects of land use; it would 
also make possible effective planning and actions for other, related matters .... Other 
regional agencies should be considered for later consolidation into the new Regional 
Commission. These could include the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality 
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Despite the support of the environmental, minority rights, and 
affordable housing advocates, the bill creating the Regional Commis-
sion was rejected by the California legislature. This rejection was due 
in large part to two factors. First, some existing agencies proved 
unwilling to transfer authority or funding to the new Regional Com-
mission. l44 Second, many less populated Bay Area suburban commu-
nities were convinced that the Regional Commission's agenda would 
be dominated by urban interests.145 
Although recent efforts to strengthen metropolitan-wide govern-
ance did not succeed in the San Francisco Bay Area, other cities have 
had better luck. In 1978, for instance, Portland, Oregon voters ap-
proved the creation of a new multi-county agency, the Metropolitan 
Services Agency, with significant land-use authority.146 The Metropoli-
tan Services Agency, or "Tri-Met," whose councilors are elected from 
the city's three counties, has jurisdiction over development, housing, 
and open space preservation for the entire Portland metropolitan 
area.147 Portland's multi-county agency has been credited with pre-
venting the sprawl, traffic congestion, and affordable housing short-
ages that have plagued many other cities.148 
While an agency like Tri-Met may not be the appropriate solution 
for all cities, Portland has at least provided an important model for 
metropolitan governance. The citizens of Portland have demonstrated 
that it is indeed politically possible to create metropolitan institutions 
that operate at the same scale as the land-use problems confronting 
our cities.149 
In the area of brownfields remediation policy, the critical task will 
be to place environmental and economic justice issues at the center 
of the redevelopment process. Through the federal EPA Brownfields 
Action Agenda, and similar state environmental reforms, the liability 
Id. 
Control Board, the Bay Conservation and Development Commission, and other single-
purpose agencies acting on issues of regional concern. 
144 See Bodovitz Interview, supra note 141. 
145 See id. 
146 See John King, Portland's Metro Government Role, Pawer Still Being Defined, CONTRA 
COSTA TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at 1A. 
147 See id. at 9A. 
148 See generally Charles A. Hales, Higher Density Plus Certainty Equals Affordable Hous-
ingfor portland, URB. LAND, Sept. 1991, at 12-15. 
149 See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 182. "Unless Americans confront this reality by creating 
institutions that operate at the same scale as their major problems, their problems will only get 
worse." Id. 
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framework for contaminated properties is beginning to change.15o 
State and federal laws and regulations increasingly offer enhanced 
protection to investors who are willing to purchase sites with real or 
perceived hazardous waste problems.151 While these investors will 
likely help put brownfields back into economic use, it remains unclear 
what impact this redevelopment will have on inner-city communities 
and the environment. 
State and federal governments can play an important role in shap-
ing the redevelopment process. Most significantly, governments can 
provide a regulatory framework that will point the private sector, the 
underlying engine of brownfields redevelopment, in a more environ-
mentally progressive and equitable direction.152 Governments can re-
fuse to accept lower cleanup and health standards for properties 
located in poor inner-city neighborhoods. They can develop more 
powerful tax incentives, along the lines of the federal Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA), to ensure that brownfield redevelopment 
loans from private banks are made to businesses from within dis-
tressed neighborhoods. l53 They can adopt policies that link prospec-
tive purchaser and lender liability protections to whether the pro-
posed redevelopment project will have tangible health and economic 
benefits to the local community. 
One possible model for integrating remediation reform with envi-
ronmental justice is the federal Small Business Administration 
(SBA).l54 SBA establishes a program which encourages federal agen-
cies to favor small business enterprises (SBEs) in the awarding of 
government contracts, as long as these SBEs possess the capacity and 
expertise to perform the contracts.155 SBA's program recognizes that: 
0) smaller enterprises, because of economies of scale and vertical 
integration, are often underbid by larger national or international 
companies; and (2) there are valid policy reasons for providing some 
degree of protection for these smaller enterprises, which are often 
owned by and employ workers from the local community, notwith-
standing that these smaller enterprises can be underbid by larger 
150 See supra text accompanying notes 80-93. 
151 See id. 
152 See NRDC Official: Broumfields Programs Offer E-Justice to Communities, ENV'T WK., 
June 16, 1997, at 287-88. 
153 See CRA Credits, supra note 89. 
154 See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1994). 
155 See Timothy S. Kerr, Small Business Preferences in Federal Procurement, LEGAL INTEL-
LIGENCER, May 18, 1992, at 4. 
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national and international companies.156 SBA provides a means to 
protect and promote these neighborhood, community focused, busi-
nesses. 
EPA and other state environmental agencies could establish liabil-
ity release programs that operated similar to the SBA program. The 
decision of whether to release a private party from future remediation 
liability could be based, in part, on whether the private party is a 
community enterprise. EPA and other state environmental agencies 
could establish a policy expressly favoring community enterprises in 
the granting of liability releases, or granting non-community enter-
prises less extensive releases from future remediation liability. SBA-
type liability release programs would promote environmental justice 
goals by helping to ensure that community enterprises participate in 
the economic benefits of brownfields reclamation. 
Another possible model for integrating remediation reform with 
environmental justice are the Restoration Advisory Boards (RABs), 
created to help deal with environmental cleanup issues relating to 
military base closures.157 RABs are charged with helping develop and 
monitor the remediation process.158 In theory, RAB plans recognize 
that military bases operate as integrated economic communities 
rather than as isolated parcels of property, and that closure and 
remediation have broad community repercussions.159 EPA and other 
state environmental agencies could establish community based 
boards, along the lines of RABs, that would help guide neighborhood 
remediation policy and objectives. These RAB-type boards would 
help ensure that government decisions regarding cleanup standards 
156 See William J. Dennis et ai., Small Business Job Creation: The Findings and Their Critics, 
Bus. ECON., July 1994, at 23. 
157 See Lenny Siegel, Key Lessons for Brownjields from the Base Closure Cleanup Process, 
at 1 (Sept. 20, 1996) (unpublished fact sheet prepared in conjunction with CAREERIPRO, a 
program of the San Francisco Urban Institute) (on file with author). This proposal is also based 
on Lenny Siegel's presentation to the San Francisco Brownfields Working Group in July 1996, 
during which he elaborated on how the RABs can serve as a potential model for increasing the 
community focus of brownfields remediation. 
158 See Naval Center Seeks Help From Public, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 5, 1996, at B3. 
159 See Raymond Takashi Swenson, Remediating Military 'Brownjields,' NATL L.J., Nov. 6, 
1995, at Cll. 
[d. 
The community and its citizens are given a formal voice in the remedial process 
through a restoration advisory board that meets monthly with the EPA and state 
remedial project managers at each closing base. The board is provided updates on the 
progress of remedial investigation and action, and its input is solicited. 
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and liability are dealt with from a community-based, rather than a 
parcel-by-parcel, perspective. 
Through the 1993 Executive Orderl60 and the 1995 NEJAC public 
dialogues,161 the Clinton Administration has taken several bold sym-
bolic steps in the area of environmental justice. Now what is needed 
are policies to translate this rhetoric into political and economic real-
ity, so that brownfields reclamation can contribute to the larger rec-
lamation of America's troubled cities. The Community Reinvestment 
Act, the Small Business Administration, and Restoration Advisory 
Boards provide a starting point for developing and implementing such 
policies. 
CONCL USION: THE CITY IN CONTEXT 
For centuries, the U.S. frontier was about breaking the land, push-
ing the geographic edges of development continuously outward. As 
suburban sprawl, urban decay, and environmental pollution have 
made plain, however, that frontier has reached its end. Ecologically, 
economically, and politically, the paradigm of uncontrolled and con-
tinuous outward land development cannot be sustained. 
The frontier before us now is about forging new relationships 
among our cities, farmlands, and wildlands. It is about constructing 
policies and economies that promote the health and livelihood of all 
our citizens, not just the privileged. The effort to reconcile open space, 
brownfields, and justice issues is on the leading edge of this new 
frontier. The success or failure of this effort will impact not only the 
fate of our cities, but the fate of our ecology and economy as well. 
160 See Exec. Order No. 12,898,3 C.F.R. 859 (1994) (reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
(1994». 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 120-26. 
